In 1964, John Bell proved that quantum mechanics is "unreasonable" (to use Einstein's term):
I think that when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, although history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. I feel that Einstein's intellectual superiority over Bohr, in this instance, was enormous; a vast gulf between the man who saw clearly what was needed, and the obscurantist. So for me, it is a pity that Einstein's idea doesn't work. The reasonable thing just doesn't work." True, history has confirmed nonlocal quantum correlations; but has history passed judgment on Einstein and "the others"? Consider what Newton [4] wrote about his own theory of gravity: "That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action or force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it." More than two centuries years later, Einstein confirmed Newton's misgivings: gravitational interactions are indeed local. Einstein's theory of gravity is free of the "absurdity" of action at a distance. Well, if it took centuries for history to justify Newton's rejection of action at a distance, couldn't history yet justify Einstein's rejection of action at a distance? This paper offers, not the reasonable thing, but a reasonable thing that just might work.
Section I reviews the search for simple physical axioms from which to derive quantum mechanics. Ideally, such a search could help us understand the theory and make it seem more reasonable. But, while we can derive a part of quantum mechanics from three simple physical axioms, one of the three axioms is the unreasonable axiom of nonlocality! Apparently, we are no better off than before. However, Sect. II considers replacing the axiom of nonlocality with an axiom that even Bell and Einstein might have considered reasonable: an axiom of local retrocausality (microscopic time-reversal symmetry). Then Sect. III rewrites the derivation in Sect. I using the three axioms of causality, local retrocausality, and the existence of a classical limit.
I. NONLOCAL CORRELATIONS IN THE CLASSICAL LIMIT
It is convenient to discuss Bell's inequality in the form derived by Clausner, Horne, Shimony and Holt [5] (CHSH) for spacelike separated measurements by "Alice" and "Bob" on a bipartite system: nonlocal. But it is a curious fact, discovered by Tsirelson [6] , that the violation of Eq. (1) by quantum correlations C Q (a, b), etc., is bounded by 2 √ 2:
even though it is straightforward to define "superquantum" correlations
that violate Eq. (1) maximally. A good guess is that superquantum (or "PR-box" [7] ) correlations are too strong to be consistent with relativistic causality, but this guess is easily disproved [7, 8] . Just assume that when Alice measures a or a she gets ±1 with equal probability, and likewise when Bob measures b or b ; this assumption is consistent with Eq.
(3) and it implies that Alice and Bob cannot signal to each other, since in any case Alice
and Bob obtain ±1 with equal probability from their measurements.
Nonlocal quantum correlations are unreasonable, and not even maximally unreasonable! But perhaps we should not be so surprised that PR-box correlations are consistent with relativistic causality. After all, we have set up quite an artificial comparison. We have not compared two theories. We have compared nonlocal quantum correlations belonging to a complete theory-quantum mechanics-with ad hoc super-duper nonlocal correlations that do not belong to any theory we know. We are not even comparing apples and oranges. We are comparing a serial Nobel prize winner and a lottery winner. Quantum mechanics, as a complete theory, is subject to constraints. In particular, quantum mechanics has a classical limit. In this limit there are no complementary observables; there are only macroscopic observables, all of which are jointly measurable. This classical limit-our direct experienceis an inherent constraint, a kind of boundary condition, on quantum mechanics and on any generalization of quantum mechanics. Thus stronger-than-quantum correlations, too, must have-as a minimal requirement-a classical limit.
And now the fun begins [9] . Consider the PR box and note that if Alice measures a and obtains 1, she can predict with certainty that Bob will obtain 1 whether he measures b or b ;
if she obtains −1, she can predict with certainty that he will obtain −1 whether he measures Next, suppose that Alice measures a or a consistently on N pairs. Let us define macroscopic observables B and B : will be ±1/ √ N (but possibly as large as ±1) and anti-correlated. Thus Alice can signal a single bit to Bob by consistently choosing whether to measure a or a . This claim is delicate because the large-N limit in which B and B commute is also the limit that suppresses the fluctuations of B and B . We cannot make any assumption about the approach to the classical limit; all that we assume is that it exists, e.g. that the uncertainty product ∆B∆B can be made as small as desired, for large enough N . On the other hand, the axiom of relativistic causality cannot grant Bob even the slightest indication about both B and B . Hence all we need is that when Bob detects a correlation, it is more likely that Alice measured a than when he detects an anti-correlation. If it were not more likely, it would mean that Bob's measurements yield zero information about B or about B , contradicting the fact that there is a classical limit in which B and B are jointly measurable.
To ensure that Bob has a good chance of measuring B and B accurately enough to determine whether they are correlated or anti-correlated, N may have to be large and therefore the fluctuations in B and B will be small. However, Alice and Bob can repeat this experiment (on N pairs at a time) as many times as it takes to give Bob a good chance of catching and measuring large enough fluctuations. Alice and Bob's expenses and exertions are not our concern. Relativistic causality does not forbid superluminal signalling only when it is cheap and reliable. Relativistic causality forbids superluminal signalling altogether. We have ruled out superquantum correlations [9] . To derive quantum correlations, however, we have to rule out all stronger-than-quantum correlations, i.e. we have to derive
Tsirelson's bound from the three axioms of nonlocality, relativistic causality, and the existence of a classical limit. The proof appears elsewhere [10] .
The existence of a classical limit is not the only axiom we can consider adding to the axioms of nonlocality and relativistic causality. Alternative axioms [11] (or a stronger axiom of relativistic causality called "information causality" [12] ), have been shown to rule out PR-box correlations, and come close to ruling out all stronger-than-quantum correlations.
However, the physical significance of these axioms requires clarification. Navascués and Wunderlich [13] consider an axiom for a classical limit, but define the classical limit via the "wiring" [14] of entangled systems, and not via complementary measurements that become jointly measurable as the number N of systems grows without bound.
II. LOCAL RETROCAUSALITY AS AN AXIOM
Bell's theorem rules out any locally causal account of quantum mechanics. But a number of authors, most notably Price [15] , have suggested a locally causal-retrocausal account of quantum mechanics. Here "causality" means "relativistic causality" as before (i.e. no superluminal signalling); what is "retro" is that the effect precedes the cause. If the retrocausality is local-no action at a distance-then the order of cause and effect is independent of the reference frame. Retrocausality is an expression of a fundamental time-reversal symmetry in physics. While time-reversal symmetry is not manifest at the macroscopic level-for example, a star emits more light than it absorbs-we explain the asymmetry by saying that the universe has not reached a state of maximum entropy. At the same time, almost all fundamental physical processes at the microscopic level exhibit time-reversal symmetry.
Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (ABL) [16] derived an explicitly time-symmetric formula for intermediate quantum probabilities, conditioned on initial and final states; they suggested that quantum mechanics has no arrow of time of its own and that time asymmetry (e.g. in measurements) originates in macroscopic physics. While the ABL formula is not manifestly local, it opens the way to a local account of quantum mechanics via local retrocausality. Such an account would replace nonlocality with something not only local, but even palatable: a fundamental time-reversal symmetry of microscopic causality and retrocausality. Moreover, if the account includes the quantum correlations that violate Bell's inequality, we can replace the axiom of nonlocality assumed in Sect. I with an axiom of local retrocausality, and try to derive quantum mechanics from the three axioms of (relativistic) causality, local retrocausality, and the existence of a classical limit. Sect. III begins such a derivation.
Remarkably, retrocausality is intrinsic to quantum mechanics, as we see if we consider three observers, Alice, Bob and Jim, who share an ensemble of triplets of spin-1/2 particles in the Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger (GHZ) [17] 
(See Fig. 1 ; Alice, Bob and Jim each get one particle in each triplet.) Let Alice and Bob, at spacetime points A and B, measure spin components σ (A) ·n A and σ (B) ·n B , respectively, on their particles. For simplicity, let the unit vectorsn A andn B (which may change from particle to particle) lie in the xy-plane. Let Jim have the special role of the "jammer" [18] ; he chooses whether to put the particles held by Alice and Bob in a product state or an entangled state. To put them in a product state, Jim (at spacetime point J) measures
z , the z-component of the spin of his particles. To put them in an entangled state, he measures, say, σ (J)
x . It doesn't matter when Jim makes his measurements. In Fig.  1 according to the Bell state that she finds for it. Over time, she will be able to measure the quantum correlations between Alice's and Bob's measurements from the binned data, for each Bell state. These quantum correlations are precisely the nonlocal quantum correlations that violate Bell's inequality, since for quantum probabilities, and hence for correlations, time order does not matter:
where |B i is any one of the four Bell states. Yet nothing even slightly nonlocal is going on here. The results of Alice's and Bob's measurements propagate locally and causally to Claire, who "clarifies" the overall state of each pair of particles that arrives in her laboratory with her measurement. The reason that Fig. 2(a) is locally causal is that local causality brings the results of Alice's, Bob's and Claire's measurements all together at the spacetime point C. In Fig. 2(b) , local causality cannot bring the results of Alice's, Bob's and Claire's measurements all together at any point, because the particles in each pair diverge to spacetime points A and B. Thus the conditions for Bell's theorem hold and the quantum correlations of Fig. 2(b) , which are also the quantum correlations of Fig. 2(a) , are nonlocal.
Nevertheless, time-reversal symmetry suggests that Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) are analogous.
Perhaps local retrocausality could play the role in Fig. 2 (b) that local causality cannot play:
local retrocausality could propagate the results of Alice's and Bob's measurements at A and B, respectively, backwards in time to bring the results of Alice's, Bob's and Claire's measurements all together at the spacetime point C. Using the ABL formula, we can express the conditional probability that Claire's measurement at spacetime point C yields the Bell state |B j as
where |0 is the state of the two spin-1/2 particles at time t 0 , before Claire's measurement, t C is the time of her measurement, and t AB is the time of Alice's and Bob's measurements, which we can take (for simplicity and without lost of generality) to be simultaneous. The unitary operator U (t AB − t C ) can be rewritten as U † (t C − t AB ) to remove any arrow of time from the ABL formula: But we have already noted that time-reversal symmetry holds only for microscopic physics,
and not for macroscopic physics. In particular, the Born rule belongs to the realm of macroscopic physics. In Fig. 2(b) , we can use formulation of quantum mechanics [16, 20] .
It is also consistent with free will, in the following sense. There would be a problem regarding free will if, say, Alice could obtain any information about what she measured before the measurement. Any physical theory that allowed such a causal loop would be inconsistent.
But suppose Alice could not obtain any such information before the measurement, but someone else could. No causal loop could arise, but would we still say that Alice has free will? The question does not apply to Fig. 2(b) because no one has access to information about Alice's measurement before the event A: a normal ("strong") measurement between
A and C would eliminate the causal/retrocausal connection between the two events, and a "weak" measurement [21] could yield a result only after Alice's measurement.
III. PR-BOX CORRELATIONS FROM LOCAL RETROCAUSALITY
We can now define a toy model for the PR box as a retrocausal box rather than a nonlocal box (as Argaman [22] defined a toy model for bipartite singlet correlations). Returning to as not satisfying the three axioms of causality, local retrocausality and the existence of a classical limit. Likewise, from these three axioms alone we can expect to derive Tsirelson's bound-a theorem of quantum mechanics.
To conclude, local retrocausality offers us an alternative to "spooky action at a distance".
Would Einstein have accepted it? Is local retrocausality a deep principle worthy of being an axiom? It is appropriate to let Bell have the last word [23] :
"I think Einstein thought that Bohm's model was too glib-too simple. I think he was looking for a much more profound rediscovery of quantum phenomena. The idea that you could just add a few variables and the whole thing [quantum mechanics] would remain unchanged apart from the interpretation, which was a kind of trivial addition to ordinary quantum mechanics, must have been a disappointment to him. I can understand that-to see that that is all you need to do to make a hidden-variable theory. I am sure that Einstein, and most other people, would have liked to have seen some big principle emerging, like the principle of relativity, or the principle of the conservation of energy. In Bohm's model one did not see anything like that."
